Understanding the Origins of the First World War

[Barbirollians]

The slumbering conflict which erupted into WW I wouldn't have been a WW IF Britain would have stayed out of it;

more importantly most likely wouldn't have laid the ground for the resentment which were the seeds for Nazi-Germany to arise IF especially revenche-seeking France had declined to simply dictate the humiliating Treaty of Versailles, by which Germany -with no foreign troops within its borders in November 1918- lost all his colonies, lost a substantial part of its European territory, was forced to pay repairs (the last instalment was paid IIRC in 2010 !), and suffered occupation of its industrial heartland (the Ruhr-area) by the French following defaulting on the repairs-payments due to French economic mismanagement - causing the 1923 hyper-inflation in Germany (and elsewhere).



Hence, slumbering conflicts can and IMO inevitably will erupt, but the consequences cannot be assessed because of this kind of now unknown IFs

Erm that analysis completely ignores the influence of Bismarckian Prussian expansionism - some of the territory the Germans lost was that they had colonised in 1871 Alsace -Lorraine and parts of Poland they had kindly shared with Russia .

The reparations fiasco was undoubtedly a disaster.

[Demetrius]

Erm that analysis completely ignores the influence of Bismarckian Prussian expansionism - some of the territory the Germans lost was that they had colonised in 1871 Alsace -Lorraine and parts of Poland they had kindly shared with Russia .

The reparations fiasco was undoubtedly a disaster.

I would leave out Bismarckian (Prussian is mostly right though) - the guy was not at all pleased with Alsace and the later drive for a German Empire - not because he didn't like additional German Territories as such, but because he recognised the dangers of both pissing of the French and the British. The 2nd WW as an extention of the First is an interesting concept (Didn't Churchill coin it?), but it ignores that while both the misrecognision of the situation in the field (The German felt themselves undefeated, which they weren't) and the harsh Versailles Treaty eventually led to 1933-45, that outcome was not predestined. At the beginning of 1933, Hitler's movement was already beyond its peak, with the NSDAP loosing 2 million Votes between the elections of July and December 1932. And even with all the terror of a unleashed SA after his "Takeover" they didn't manage to get a clear majority of votes in March 1933. The Economic pressure was slowly ebbing of, and with it, the support for Hitler would have shrunk back - not to its precrisis size of 2,6 %, but to something in the region of 10-15 % perhaps. The reperations for WWI had been cut back and lifted entirely in 1931/32, and while people were mouthy about Alsace and the "polish corridor" there was sparse support for war even in 1939. If Hindenburg and von Papen hadn't pushed Hitler to the fore, things very probably would have went differently, harsh treaty or not.

Can't see why any one would attack the British for acting in accordance with their alliances in 1914 when the German "Nibelungentreue" is accepted. If the German had been a bit less supportive to their Austro-Hungarian Partners, the war might have been stopped too. It just didn't work out that way. If the British and the French hadn't (kind of, somewhat and way too half-assed) stood with Poland in 1939 there wouldn't have been a WW II either. On the other hand, if they had used their considerable military resources to crush German defences while they were occupied in Poland, the war would have ended right there and then.

reg the last payments of 2010, that was money owed for loans taken out to satisfy reparations in the 1920s. Payment were stalled till after an eventual reunification of Germany (in 1953) and 1990 they came up with a 20 Year payment scheme. These payments together with the investments into eastern Germany still did not manage to stop Germany from becoming the economical powerhouse they are today - these remains were easily managable.

[jean]

I have just read Louis de Bernieres' Birds without Wings which was (to me) a fascinating account of the lead-up to the First World War from the perspective of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire.

[Petrushka]

Marshal Foch said of the Versailles Treaty: ' This is not a peace treaty, it is an armistice for twenty years'.

The way the map of Europe was re-drawn in 1919 made another war inevitable at some stage and that's without any consideration of the reparations issue.

The time Hitler could have been stopped was either at the re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 and again at the annexation of Austria in 1938. On both occasions Hitler was seriously worried that the Allies would fight and he well knew that it would have been a war he would have lost.

[mercia]

there are probably as many views on the origins of WWI as there are historians - wikipedia recommends several books - under Further Reading

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origins_of_World_War_I

[Historian]

The relevant Wikipedia article on the Historiography of the Causes of the First World War is here. A colleague of mine recently recommended this historiographical survey:

Jay Winter and Antoine Frost: The Great War in History, Cambridge, 2005.

It seems to be quite expensive and difficult to get hold of but I will be trying through the Inter-Library Loan system which (at least for the time being) is one of the glories of the public library system.

[Barbirollians]

A very positive review from Anthony Beevor in the Times for this new history by Margaret Macmillan which is released on Thursday

http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-War-that...1748006&sr=1-1

[Demetrius]

The way the map of Europe was re-drawn in 1919 made another war inevitable at some stage and that's without any consideration of the reparations issue.

The map of Europe was re-drawn again in 1945, and yet historical cirumstances lead after a few decades to a broad acceptance of this new map. One tends to see certain outcomes as inevitable in hindsight, while things were very much up for grabs.

1936 and 1938 were indeed chances to stop Hitler Germany in its track. But the Military Powerratio changed only marginally between 38 and 39, except possibly the German headstart in regards to air power decreasing. Both times a huge amount of German troups were bound in the east and the German West had no Defense positions of any strengh (compared to the Maginot line or the later Atlantic fortifactions of the Germans). If the French and British had invaded during the Czechoslovakia crisis, or if they had invaded in September 39, the Results would have been the same, as the Germans were in no position to defend themselves, had not yet mobilized fully and were considerably weaker than the forces the Allies could field.

Prophets such as Foch are remembered because their prophecies turned out right, you will find others that are forgotten because they guessed wrong. If History had turned out differently, Fochs prophecy would be forgotten and these others would reign surpreme in our memories.

Again, the Versailles treaty was certainly a reason for WW II, it just wasn't inevitable. History is fluid and slippery, pinning something down to a major reason that made something unavoidable almost always fails to paint a sufficient picture of the time. In this case, it focuses on a sole foreign policy aspect and ommits the domestic, economic and indeed social reasons that helped to bring the Nazis into a position were they could stumble themselves into total power. Hitler was lifted into the chancellory by his predecessor, who thought he could rule through that little man. He guessed wrong. If von Papen and certain persons around Hindenburg hadn't pressed for Hitler hoping for personal gains, what would have happened?

As I said before, the support in the populace was fading by the end of 1932, the economy was slowly raising its head, the reperations were a thing of the past, and few people had any love for a new general war in their lifetimes.



Coming back to the topic of the thread, the extensive wikipedia article shows just how many factors played into the the explosion of 1914. Just to pick out a few things, while the war was certainly caused directly by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the all thumbs German foreign policy in several instances and the maritim armsrace between Germany and Great Britain contributed strongly to the increasingly aggressive stances culmination in 1914. On the other hand, if the Kaiser had died suddenly in 1913 or the Balkan crisis had been averted, as it could have been, he would likely still be reknowed as a ruler of a peacefull and prosperous era, as he was (in Germany) in the years leading up to the war. Historical Perception is fickle

[Barbirollians]

The map of Europe was re-drawn again in 1945, and yet historical cirumstances lead after a few decades to a broad acceptance of this new map. One tends to see certain outcomes as inevitable in hindsight, while things were very much up for grabs.

1936 and 1938 were indeed chances to stop Hitler Germany in its track. But the Military Powerratio changed only marginally between 38 and 39, except possibly the German headstart in regards to air power decreasing. Both times a huge amount of German troups were bound in the east and the German West had no Defense positions of any strengh (compared to the Maginot line or the later Atlantic fortifactions of the Germans). If the French and British had invaded during the Czechoslovakia crisis, or if they had invaded in September 39, the Results would have been the same, as the Germans were in no position to defend themselves, had not yet mobilized fully and were considerably weaker than the forces the Allies could field.

Prophets such as Foch are remembered because their prophecies turned out right, you will find others that are forgotten because they guessed wrong. If History had turned out differently, Fochs prophecy would be forgotten and these others would reign surpreme in our memories.

Again, the Versailles treaty was certainly a reason for WW II, it just wasn't inevitable. History is fluid and slippery, pinning something down to a major reason that made something unavoidable almost always fails to paint a sufficient picture of the time. In this case, it focuses on a sole foreign policy aspect and ommits the domestic, economic and indeed social reasons that helped to bring the Nazis into a position were they could stumble themselves into total power. Hitler was lifted into the chancellory by his predecessor, who thought he could rule through that little man. He guessed wrong. If von Papen and certain persons around Hindenburg hadn't pressed for Hitler hoping for personal gains, what would have happened?

As I said before, the support in the populace was fading by the end of 1932, the economy was slowly raising its head, the reperations were a thing of the past, and few people had any love for a new general war in their lifetimes.



Coming back to the topic of the thread, the extensive wikipedia article shows just how many factors played into the the explosion of 1914. Just to pick out a few things, while the war was certainly caused directly by the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the all thumbs German foreign policy in several instances and the maritim armsrace between Germany and Great Britain contributed strongly to the increasingly aggressive stances culmination in 1914. On the other hand, if the Kaiser had died suddenly in 1913 or the Balkan crisis had been averted, as it could have been, he would likely still be reknowed as a ruler of a peacefull and prosperous era, as he was (in Germany) in the years leading up to the war. Historical Perception is fickle

History is littered with What Ifs - what if the Nationalists had not been so foolish as to believe Hitler would be their puppet Chancellor - or if Hindenberg had lived another few years . etc etc

[vinteuil]

The relevant Wikipedia article on the Historiography of the Causes of the First World War is here.

.

... very many thanks, Historian, for the historiography link.

A good demonstration of how intractable the sifting out of what was really happening a mere hundred years ago proves to be. All the more extraördinary how confident some historians are as to what was happening in France 1780 -1815... or in England 1640 - 1688. Or some church people as to what happened in Palestine some two thousand years ago ....

[Historian]

I've reserved the Clarke book at my local library - thanks.

What did you think of Clark's 'The Sleepwalkers'? I finished it fairly recently and thought it was excellent. As usual when I read a good book, I realised that there was so much I didn't know about its subject. Furthermore, some of what I did know was wrong. One of Clark's strengths is spending the first two thirds of the book charting the events, personalities and 'systems' (political and military) from, roughly, 1870 which led to a great European war becoming increasingly likely by the second decade of the twentieth century. So, for example, Serbian politics are covered in depth as the Balkans are central to an understanding of the coming of the war. However, his narrative (fully annotated) also includes many areas which hadn't really swum into my consciousness very much, for example the Italo-Turkish War (1912-1913). The last third of the book covers the July Crisis in detail. Clark has a splendid command of the sources, in many languages. His discussion of the historiography is illuminating.

He doesn't try to pin the blame for the war on anyone in particular, but his analysis is more rigorous than just stating that all the participating nations were guilty. Well worth reading, if you have time. I'm now onto Winter and Prost's 'The First World War in History'. Will report when I have finished it.

[amateur51]

My word, Historian - how can I resist reading The Sleepwalkers after your review.

Many thanks

[Historian]

Ah, the pressure is on now, amateur51. Books are so personal, aren't they? All I do nowadays is say what I thought of a book and try to explain my reasons, without 'promising' that a reader will enjoy it. I hope you find it interesting. Thank you.

Apart from anything else, I think Clark is a useful corrective to any single-issue merchants out there who wish to 'pin the blame' on one or more foreign countries for varied reasons. Britain does not escape involvement in the outbreak and to see her engagement in the war as purely 'defensive' (as some recent historians have argued) is to neglect the imperial aspect of British policy-making. By 1912 Russia was already beginning to re-emerge as the main object of British policy-makers' fears. Grey's failure to go beyond informal commitments was causing increasing concern in France by 1914. So, who knows, perhaps there would have been a diplomatic re-alignment a year or two down the line, had not Princip et al intervened.

[amateur51]

Ah, the pressure is on now, amateur51. Books are so personal, aren't they? All I do nowadays is say what I thought of a book and try to explain my reasons, without 'promising' that a reader will enjoy it. I hope you find it interesting. Thank you.

No pressure at all, Historian - I've just found that Clark's book was already on my list, but now slightly higher up

[aeolium]

What did you think of Clark's 'The Sleepwalkers'? I finished it fairly recently and thought it was excellent.

I'm about half way through it (am reading a few books concurrently) and so far I am in total agreement. His analysis of the immensely complicated developments in the Balkans and the disintegrating Ottoman Empire is very lucid, and his exposition of the shifting patterns of alliances and diplomacy is impressive. I get the impression, though perhaps this is a bit premature, that he is severely critical of the belligerent group of Foreign Office diplomats that became more influential around Sir Edward Grey.

I'm also reading Gildea's Barricades and Borders, Europe 1800-1914 to get an idea of the longer-term developments that led up to the crisis - this is also a very good book.